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Abstract
Where were interest groups in the 2008 presidential election? In previous elections interest
groups have played a crucial, often attacking, role in presidential campaigns. This essay compares
the influence of interest groups in the 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns in terms of financing
election activities, shaping the campaign agenda, influencing candidate images and mobilizing
voters. Interest groups represented the barking dog that didn't bite in the 2008 presidential
election. I offer some explanations involving lessons learned from previous campaigns, strategic
calculations by groups, and the challenging issue environment for many interest groups. Despite
the muted impact of interest groups in the 2008 presidential campaign, the long-term prognosis is
that interest groups will continue to be important in American elections.
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Where were the interest groups in the 2008 presidential election? The
conventional view in the United States has been that interest groups play a crucial,
often attacking, role in presidential campaigns. And in looking at previous
elections, one can certainly find examples of important interventions by interest
groups, from the Willie Horton ad in 1988 to the Swift Boat ads in 2004.
Conservative groups have been particularly successful in leaving their mark on
recent elections, and the case can be made that interest groups played a critical
role in the 2004 presidential election.
However, it is much harder to find examples of interest group influence in
the 2008 election. Before the full release of data on fundraising, ad buys, and
surveys of 2008 voters, one cannot assess interest group activities as rigorously as
one would like. Nevertheless, this essay compares the influence of interest groups
in the 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns in terms of financing election
activities, shaping the campaign agenda, influencing candidate images, and
mobilizing voters. It appears that interest groups had less bite in the 2008 election.
Financing Election Activities
A common rule of thumb in campaign financing is that each election breaks the
spending records set in the previous cycle. With respect to candidate fundraising,
and the Obama campaign in particular, the 2008 election cycle is no exception.
Interest groups in 2008 continued this pattern in one respect but apparently not in
two other categories of campaign finance. With the important caveat that the 2008
campaign finance totals may increase as final reports come in after the end of the
year, Table 1 compares interest group campaign finance activities in federal
elections in 2004 and 2008 for the categories of PAC contributions, soft money
activities, and independent expenditures.
Table 1 indicates that PAC contributions continued to increase in 2008,
even though the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 did not raise
contribution limits for PAC donations to candidates, as it did for individual
contributions. Almost all PAC donations go to congressional candidates, so PACs
have little impact on the presidential contest. Moreover, PAC donations tend to
favor the majority party in Congress. 2008 was no exception, as PACs shifted in
favor of the Democrats, contributing to the party’s significant financial advantage
over the GOP in congressional contests (Knott 2008).
While PAC contributions increased, independent expenditures and soft
money activities by interest groups in 2008 apparently did not exceed 2004 totals.
With the ban on soft money donations to political parties enacted in BCRA, some
wealthy political donors have shifted toward 527 and 501(c) groups as a way to
influence elections with unlimited contributions. Overall, soft money groups spent
more than $440 million dollars on federal races in 2004, primarily the presidential
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campaign, an additionally hefty portion when compared to the $655 million spent
by George W. Bush and John Kerry in the same election cycle. Among the most
expensive soft money efforts on the left, Americans Coming Together spent
approximately $78 million, the Media Fund spent over $57 million, the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) spent over $47 million, and MoveOn.org
spent over $21 million during the 2004 cycle.1 Soft money activity by liberal
groups, such as the Media Fund, helped compensate for Kerry’s financial deficit
compared to the Bush campaign, especially in the spring of 2004 (Institute of
Politics 2004, 213). There were important 527 groups on the right as well,
including Progress for America (over $35 million) and Swift Boat Veterans and
POWs for Truth ($22 million).
Table 1
Election Spending by Interest Groups and Presidential Candidates
2004
Soft money:
$440 million
527 and 501(c) groups
(10%)
PAC contributions to federal candidates $311 million
(7%)
Non-party independent expenditures
$100 million
(2.4%)
Presidential candidate fundraising
$880.5 million
(21%)
Total Spending on Federal Elections
$4.2 billion
(100%)

2008
$400 million
(8%)
$400 million
(8%)
$85 million
(1.6%)
$1.7 billion
(32%)
$5.3 billion
(100%)

Note: 2008 figures are author calculations based on available reports.
Sources: Rozell, Wilcox, and Madland 2006; Campaign Finance Institute 2008; Center for
Responsive Politics 2008.

Soft money groups certainly did not vanish in 2008, as shown in Table 1.
However, the roughly $400 million in 2008 soft money spending fell short of the
soft money totals in 2004, and it was dwarfed by the more than $1 billion in
combined spending by Barack Obama and John McCain. It appears that 501(c)
groups constituted a much larger portion of soft money activity in 2008 than in
2004, perhaps due to the appeal of weaker disclosure requirements for these
organizations than for the 527 groups (Campaign Finance Institute 2008). Even
spending by the top soft money groups in 2008 looks small compared to 2004.
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The spending totals for individual groups come from The Center for Responsive Politics
(http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.php?level=C, accessed December 4, 2008).
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The top groups on the left in 2008 include SEIU ($26 million), America
Votes ($21 million), and Emily’s List ($11 million), while the highest spending
groups on the right include American Solutions Winning the Future ($20 million)
and GOPAC ($8 million). Finally, while 527 groups helped make up a spending
deficit for Democrats in 2004, soft money groups did not help Republicans
overcome Obama’s massive spending advantage over John McCain in 2008. In
fact, soft money spending in 2008 also favored the Democrats. Perhaps the
softening economy limited the ability of wealthy donors to finance 527 groups in
2008. Perhaps conservative soft money groups were unenthusiastic about
spending money to help elect a campaign finance reformer who has tried to
regulate them out of existence.
Shaping the Campaign Agenda
Another area of influence for interest groups involves the issue agenda in
elections. The ballot initiative process, available in many states, provides one
method for organized interests to shape the campaign agenda directly, provided
they invest the resources to gather enough petition signatures to put issues on the
ballot. The growing number of citizen groups devoted to post-material issues
(Berry 1999) has coincided with a substantial increase in the number of ballot
initiatives over the last thirty years. In particular, the ballot initiative process
offers a way to bring cultural conflicts (over issues such as abortion, gay rights,
and marijuana) directly to the voters. Ballot measures can then force candidates to
speak about issues they might rather avoid, and ballot measures can prime voters
to rely on certain issues when evaluating the competing candidates (Nicholson
2006).
In 2004, the Bush-Cheney campaign made no secret of its desire to get
more religious conservatives to the polls. Opportunity knocked early in that year.
First the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the state constitution
did not allow a ban on same-sex marriage. Then local officials in San Francisco
and Oregon began authorizing same-sex marriages in defiance of state laws.
Conservative groups helped to place constitutional amendments to ban gay
marriage on the November ballot in eleven states in 2004. There is some
indication that the salience of the gay marriage issue was heightened among
voters in states with initiatives on the ballot (Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith 2008).
The result was that a fair number of voters were motivated by cultural
issues (and gay marriage in particular) in the 2004 election, to the benefit of
President Bush. The critical context in 2004 was a relatively wide-open issue
environment. In a Pew survey in November of 2004 asking an open-ended
question about the most important problem facing the country , 25 percent named
the war in Iraq, 14 percent mentioned moral values, 12 percent mentioned the
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economy, 9 percent mentioned terrorism, 2 percent named health care, and over
30 percent named an assortment of other issues (Pew Research Center 2004).
Even though foreign affairs and economics were important, interest groups had
opportunities to push other issues (such as gay marriage) onto the campaign
agenda in 2004.
In the 2008 election, there were 59 citizen-sponsored initiatives on state
ballots, only a slight drop from the 66 ballot initiatives in 2004.2 In addition,
several states had ballot initiatives in 2008 dealing with cultural issues, such as
gay marriage, abortion, affirmative action, assisted suicide, animal rights, and
medicinal marijuana. Interest groups also found other means to shape the issue
agenda. A group named the Clarion Fund distributed DVD copies of Obsession, a
documentary film about the threat of radical Islam, to millions of households in
swing states in the fall of 2008. The political goal of the campaign was to raise the
salience of national security and terrorism.
Yet surveys suggest that interest group efforts to shape the issue agenda
had little impact in 2008. Relatively few voters rated cultural issues as most
important in the 2008 election, and terrorism was rated as less important than it
had been in 2004. The economic downturn in 2008 meant that economic issues
came to dominate the agenda in the presidential campaign. National events, such
as the collapse of major companies in the financial industry, meant that there was
little room to bring other issues onto the agenda.
In surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, respondents were
asked to name the most important problem facing the country. Economic
problems (either the economy in general or specific economic issues like
unemployment or the financial crisis) were named by 34 percent of survey
respondents in January of 2008, by 61 percent in July of 2008, and by 75 percent
in October of 2008 (Pew Research Center 2008a). Economic concerns thus
pushed most other issues to the fringes of the campaign agenda. This led to
frustration for some social conservatives who insisted shortly before the election
that cultural issues should still be important (Hillyer 2008). The 2008 campaign
may be an extreme example, but it indicates that there are constraints on the
ability of interest groups to increase the salience of post-material issues in
elections.
Influencing Candidate Images
Since a significant amount of interest group activity involves campaign
advertising that targets candidates, it is clear that organized groups also aim to
shape the public images of those candidates. In 2004, there is substantial evidence
2
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that interest groups left their mark on the public images of the presidential
candidates. Some of the most memorable ads of 2004 were produced by these
groups. Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth spent several million dollars on
a series of ads that challenged John Kerry’s war record in Vietnam and attacked
his anti-war efforts in the 1970s after his war service ended. The ads were aimed
to undermine Kerry’s fitness as commander-in-chief. The Swift Boat ads began
running in early August, the month in which Kerry suffered the most significant
damage to his public image on several trait measures (Jamieson 2006, 11-20).
Advisors to the Kerry campaign acknowledge that the Swift Boats ads contributed
to the erosion in support for Kerry (Jamieson 2006, 64, 69, 112; Institute for
Politics 2006, 226). The timing of the Swift Boat ads also coincided with the
publication of a book by John O’Neill (spokesman for the Swift Boat group) and
Jerome Corsi, Unfit for Command. The book, which elaborated on the critiques in
the television ads, made it onto the bestseller lists. Overall, the group was so
successful that its name has become a verb in campaign circles, as candidates now
seek to avoid getting “Swift Boated” by their opponents.
Another memorable ad by an interest group came late in the campaign
from Progress for America. The group spent several million dollars in October to
air the “Ashley’s Story” television ad. The spot, which included footage of
President Bush hugging a girl from Ohio whose mother was killed in the 9/11
attacks, aired heavily in Ohio and was regarded by Democrats as a very effective
ad at making a positive case for electing President Bush (Jamieson 2006, 69). An
image of the hug featured in the ad was also part of a viral campaign promoting
the president’s reelection, appearing on a web site and in numerous emails
(Jamieson 2006, 181).
Liberal groups in 2004, particularly the Media Fund and MoveOn.org,
aired ads criticizing the war in Iraq. These efforts probably fueled left-wing anger
at President Bush. On the other hand, advertising by groups on the left did not do
much to make a positive case for electing Kerry. The result was that Kerry voters
were motivated heavily by antipathy to President Bush rather than positive
feelings about Kerry. In the national exit poll, more than one-third of the Kerry
voters said their vote for president was mainly against Bush rather than for Kerry.
By comparison, only fifteen percent of Bush voters answered that they were
voting against Kerry. In response to open-ended likes-dislikes questions about the
candidates in the 2004 National Election Studies survey, personal trait references
to Kerry featured significantly more unfavorable comments than favorable
comments, and the most common favorable comment about Kerry was that he
wasn’t Bush (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 44-51). Interest groups likely contributed to
Kerry’s high unfavorable mentions.
While interest groups contributed to the narrative of the 2004 presidential
campaign and the public image of the candidates, it is more difficult to find
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evidence of a leading role for interest groups in the 2008 campaign. The most
memorable ads of the 2008 cycle seemed to come from the candidates (such as
the Obama infomercial, McCain’s “Celebrity” ad, Clinton’s “3AM” ad, and
Huckabee’s ads featuring Chuck Norris) rather than interest groups. Interest
groups still aired television ads in the presidential campaign, particularly in the
final weeks.
On the Republican side, for example, the National Republican Trust ran
ads late in the campaign featuring Jeremiah Wright, Obama’s former pastor; Vets
for Freedom ran ads criticizing Obama’s opposition to the surge policy in Iraq;
and Let Freedom Ring put up a spot criticizing Obama as a flip-flopper. On the
left, for example, SEIU ran an ad linking McCain to the policies of President
Bush, MoveOn.org ran a spot criticizing McCain’s support for the war in Iraq,
and Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund aired a spot criticizing Governor Palin for
a policy in Alaska to allow hunting wolves from airplanes. However, each of
these advertising buys amounted to a pittance compared to candidate and party
advertising in 2008 or even compared to interest group advertising itself in 2004
(University of Wisconsin Advertising Project 2008).
Other means of influence were used by interest groups in 2008 as well.
Jerome Corsi, co-author of Unfit for Command in 2004, returned for an encore by
publishing Obama Nation, a book critical of Obama in 2008. While Unfit for
Command remained on the bestseller lists from August to November of 2004,
Obama Nation only lasted on the bestseller lists from August until the end of
September of 2008. It seems clear that the Obama campaign prepared for the
book, and had a rapid response operation to rebut attacks quickly. A search of
LexisNexis indicates that Unfit for Command received more news coverage
devoted to the substance of its attacks than did Obama Nation. Or perhaps the
news media were less willing to amplify interest group attacks in 2008.
A more modern interest group technique in 2008 involved the viral and
whispering campaign to portray Obama as a Muslim and, more generally, as unAmerican. Figure 1 is an attempt to track this effort during the year. The graph
shows Google Trends data on the volume of web searches each week that
included the terms “Obama” and “Muslim.” The graph indicates that the highvolume periods coincided with three important electoral events. There was a
bump during the primaries and caucuses in the first three months of the year, a
spike the week after the Republican national convention, and the largest increase
in the week before the general election. However, it is unclear whether this effort
had much effect on the election. A Pew survey in October indicates that twelve
percent of Americans believed that Obama was Muslim, an amount similar to poll
results from earlier in the year (Pew Research Center 2008b). Furthermore,
Obama emerged from the general election campaign with higher ratings on
several traits than during the spring of 2008 (Pew Research Center 2008c). Thus,
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it appears that conservative efforts to hurt Obama’s public image did little
damage.
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Google Trends Search Results for “Obama Muslim” in 2008

01 Jan 08

01 Mar 08

01 May 08

01 Jul 08
Week

01 Sep 08

01 Nov 08

Why were interest groups so successful in 2004 but not in 2008? There are
a number of explanations that deserve more careful analysis when additional data
become available. One explanation lies in the fact that soft money and
independent expenditure campaigns were directed more at congressional races in
2008, thus reducing their impact on the presidential campaign. In addition,
interest group efforts succeeded in 2004 because of the confluence of two factors.
First, the Swift Boat attacks hit Kerry when he was vulnerable after the
Democratic convention, trying to save resources for September and October. As a
result, the Kerry campaign was reluctant to respond immediately. Second, the
conservative interest group ads in 2004 reinforced the Bush campaign’s efforts to
contrast the leadership abilities of the two candidates during a time of war.
These two factors were absent in 2008. The Obama campaign had the
money and organization to respond to attacks at any time. Some of the interest
group attacks on Obama did not appear until very late in the campaign. In

8

The Forum

Vol. 6 [2008], No. 4, Article 2

addition, the interest group attacks on Obama did not share a single theme—some
dealt with Iraq, some with Obama’s associations, and some with his issue
positions—and they did not reinforce McCain’s message, in part because the
McCain campaign’s main message seemed to change from one month to the next.
Voter Mobilization
In terms of mobilizing voters, there is some indication that interest group activity
continued in 2008. In 2004, the most important interest group effort toward
getting out the vote (GOTV) was organized by America Coming Together (ACT),
a liberal group of former union and Democratic Party officials trying to make up
for a voter mobilization deficiency compared to the Republican Party. ACT
claims to have registered roughly 450,000 voters in 2004 (Institute on Politics
2006, 240). They followed that up with a large GOTV campaign with thousands
of workers in several swing states.
In 2008, a coalition of liberal groups including Project Vote and
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) registered a
similar number of new voters. In the process, they touched off a campaign debate
about fraud, involving the legitimacy of some of the registration forms ACORN
submitted to election officials. This debate over election procedures is likely to
continue. Aside from getting new voters on the rolls, both parties and their
candidates had large GOTV operations in 2008. Judging by crowds at rallies, it
appears that Barack Obama and Sarah Palin did more to motivate voters than
interest groups did in 2008.
Conclusion
Overall, interest groups had a more muted impact on the 2008 presidential
election than in previous campaigns. In part, this was a matter of fundraising.
Aside from PAC contributions, interest group efforts to finance election-related
activities did not increase after 2004, and they certainly did not keep pace with the
massive increase in candidate fundraising from individual donors. In the areas of
the issue agenda, the public image of candidates, and voter mobilization, there is
plenty of evidence of interest group activity. However, the dominance of
economic concerns limited any opportunity for organized interests to place other
issues on the campaign agenda. It appears that many interest groups chose to
focus on congressional elections in 2008, but in the presidential campaign,
interest groups turned out to be the barking dog that didn’t bite. Thus, it is not a
foregone conclusion that interest groups will have a significant impact on election
outcomes.
This is not to say that interest groups have become unimportant in
American elections. Interest groups in the 2008 cycle continued to shape the long-
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term outlook of American politics. Interest group efforts in 2008 mainly played
the role of junkyard dog, attacking the other side’s candidate. Thus, interest
groups still served as a polarizing force in American politics. In addition, interest
groups played an important role in several issues regarding how elections are
administered. The ACORN voter registration controversy in particular has caused
election officials and policymakers to look more closely at voter registration
systems and consider how they can be improved. In the past two years, liberal
interest groups have pushed to replace recently purchased electronic voting
machines in California, Florida, and Ohio. These efforts are likely to intensify in
other states using electronic voting machines. In general, a movement to reform
election administration since 2000 is fueled by many interest groups.
Finally, Wisconsin Right to Life, with assistance from an effective
conservative lawyer named Jim Bopp, successfully challenged BCRA’s
restrictions on issue advertising before the Supreme Court. The case appears to
establish a blueprint for a series of legal challenges that could substantially
weaken the regulatory system created by BCRA. Just after the election, Bopp and
the Republican National Committee filed another lawsuit taking aim at BCRA’s
ban on soft money fundraising by political parties. When it comes to
controversies over the rules of the game, interest groups are unlikely to let
sleeping dogs lie.
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